

1. Introduction

From November 29 to December 1, 2011, two Prime Ministers, over 100 Ministers, 50 parliamentarians and 40 heads of international organizations, including the UN Secretary General, will meet in Busan, South Korea, at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (**HLF-4**). With the Paris Declaration having technically expired in 2010, Busan “must deliver the foundations for an ambitious, inclusive partnership in support of effective co-operation and collaborative action to advance progress on the Millennium Development Goals by 2015”.¹ The ambition for Busan is to create a short, high-level political and actionable statement. But political commitments must be backed up with some firm indicators, time bound commitments and a monitorable framework if these commitments are to be meaningful and generate the necessary political will to carry them forward.²

That said, preparations for Busan and the current draft Busan Outcome Document (**BOD4**) seems to have successfully opened up the space for a broader range of development actors and a set of common, but differentiated, principles to guide them as development actors. There are some important advances in BOD4 on gender equality, women’s rights, identifying the complementary roles of parliament, local government, regional institutions and civil society as development actors. BOD4 explicitly acknowledges that civil society effectiveness will be guided by the Istanbul Principles and the Siem Reap Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness. It also reflects important developments in South-South cooperation and in understanding the role of non-aid resource flows in advancing “development effectiveness” – although defining this term is still a point of intense debate.

The Busan process is unique as a multilateral process in that multiple stakeholders, including civil society through the BetterAid Coordinating Group, are directly involved in the preparations for Busan and in the negotiations to shape the final Outcome Document.

2.0 Onwards to Busan

2.1 Structure of the BOD (based on the Fourth Draft- **BOD4**, with some comparison to **BOD3**)³

The current draft BOD is divided into three main sections: 1) a “Preamble” (paras 1-12) that includes, “Shared principles to achieve common goals”; 2) “Realizing Change: Collaborative action and differentiated

¹ Third Draft Outcome Document for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Letter from the Co-Chairs, p.2, 10 October 2011, DCD/DAC/EFF(2011)13

² Paris had a set of indicators to monitor progress and the OECD has conducted periodic surveys on this, the most recent of which garnered strong up-take by donors and partner governments. But the *Progress Since Paris Report* essentially noted some progress by partner countries in terms of ownership and improving and strengthening public institutions, and overall progress on coordination on technical cooperation (the only one of thirteen targets for 2010 to have been met), although not southern-directed technical assistance, but otherwise little progress. In sum, even indicators are no substitute for political will.

³ BOD4 came out on November 11 and will be the source of negotiations on November 18, and was based on a high level negotiation session that took place in Paris on November 4th. BOD5 – the final draft for Busan – will emerge from this November 18 meeting. BetterAid has been present and represented in all of the negotiating sessions, along with the rest of the “sherpa” team. See footnote 5 below for details.

commitments” (paras 12.5-29), which takes account the different development stakeholders involved in Busan and focuses on improving the quality and effectiveness of development cooperation (12.5 – 23), but which now also includes “From effective aid to cooperation for effective development” (paras 24-29), which focuses on shared and sustainable growth, the role of the private sector, trade etc in effective development; and 3) “The Road ahead: Partnering for progress towards and beyond the MDGs” (paras 30-31) on accountability to the BOD commitments and future multilateral architecture for development cooperation.

The preamble is intended to reflect commitments agreed by all stakeholders involved and implicated in the BOD. It sets out the rationale, importance of, and overall direction for a new partnership going forward; b) is relevant to all development actors; c) demonstrates a strong link with the Millennium Development Goals (**MDGs**); d) stresses a diversity of actors, partnerships and funding modalities; e) addresses the need for common, and differentiated, responsibilities for this broad range of actors; f) reaffirms existing commitments, but also commits to being more coherent in all public policies and to reduce dependency on aid, while also g) trying to leverage a broader range and diversity of finance for development.

Paragraphs 10 to 12 are critical components of the BOD in that they express the “**shared principles to achieve common goals**” applicable to all development actors, including non-DAC donors, civil society organizations and the private sector. They remain under negotiation, but currently these include: a) ownership (now just by developing countries, not by their citizens, and country specific); b) a focus on results (focused on eradicating poverty and inequality, building capacity, (now also) sustainable development and aligned with country priorities); c) inclusive partnerships (different and complementary roles of all actors – building on the Accra Agenda for Action (**AAA**)) and d) accountability to citizens and others (beyond donors to beneficiaries, citizens, organisations). Paragraphs 11 and 12 set out ways in which these principles will be put into practice, including country level agreements “with all actors concerned” [i.e. including civil society] to monitor progress on commitments and results, common and individual commitments at the international level, and a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation at the political level – that effectively replaces the current Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (**WP-EFF**).

Section two is the largest section and lays out the collaborative actions (paras 12.5-23) and differentiated responsibilities (paras 24-29) for different actors. While the substance of these paragraphs is being debated in the negotiations, the other concern is that the notion of “we” is unclear in some paragraphs. Who is supposed to undertake the specific commitments? Both non-DAC donors and CSOs raise this latter concern. Regardless, this section focuses on the following: it gives a nod to the important role of countries that are both aid recipients and donors (para 12.5); that Paris and Accra were useful and those who committed to them need to go further (paras 13-14). This commitment includes a particular focus on the following: a) country-led ownership, results and accountability (paras 15-18) frameworks, including a strong focus on building statistical capacity to monitor outcomes and results, creating effective institutions and policies (enhanced), promoting gender equality through targets and sex-disaggregated data, strengthening the role of parliaments and local government, and (para 19) recognizing the role of civil society as independent but complementary development actors, the need for an environment that enables these contributions (but no minimum standards), and recognition of the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework (new); b) transparent and

responsible cooperation (paras 20-21) through more accessible, transparent aid information, standards for aid transparency (not necessarily the International Aid Transparency Initiative), predictable rolling timelines for aid commitments, country compacts to address the challenge of fragmentation, greater policy coherence across the range of multilateral institutions, (possibly) guidelines to reduce the proliferation of funding channels, measures to increase aid to countries that most need it, and greater delegation of authority to the field; c) *promoting sustainable development in situation of conflict and fragility* (para 22), building on the five Peace-building and State-building Goals; and d) *Partnering to strengthen resilience and vulnerability* (para 23), with partner countries integrating resilience and disaster management into their own policies and strategies, and donors investing in systems to reduce shocks. CSOs in BetterAid have provided commentary and alternative text for many of these sections including para 19, adding the inclusion of minimum standards for an enabling environment for CSOs.

Section two also includes the sub-section on differentiated responsibilities (paras 24 – 29), which begins to make the link to the broader effective development agenda – changed from earlier iterations from an agenda for “development effectiveness”. The BOD currently sees effective development including the following elements (para 24): driven by strong, sustainable and inclusive growth; more active engagement of governments in mobilizing domestic resources and being accountable to their citizens for results; supportive of various domestic development actors holding each other to account; and greater regional and global integration of economies. While “development effectiveness” is a primary focus for CSOs, this section only makes a passing reference to human rights.

In BOD4 as currently structured, the effective development agenda includes a greater focus on the following: a) *South-south and triangular cooperation* (paras 25-26), including its value, the need to scale it up, better coordinate it, strengthen networks and peer-to-peer learning (but now without specific reference to learning on strengthening social protection, reducing inequality and promoting the MDGs); b) *Private sector and development* (para 27), including better legal, regulatory and administrative environment for business, more active private sector engagement in policy design and implementation, as a source of innovative finance, more aid for trade, and further private-public partnerships; c) *combating corruption and illicit flows* (para 28), including fiscal transparency, whistleblower protection, independent enforcement, and enhancing efforts to combat illicit financial flows; and d) *climate change finance* (para 29), including a commitment to be more coherent transparent and predictable in terms of the delivery of climate finance, to support national climate change policy and planning as an integral part of developing countries’ development plans and share lessons learned in development effectiveness with entities engaged in climate activities (a step back from previous plans to link aid effectiveness principles to climate financing, limit the proliferation of funds, and invite the UNFCCC to agree on a definition of “new and additional” funding).

Finally, **section four** addresses ways to partner for progress towards and beyond the MDGs. It is intended to establish forward momentum beyond Busan at both the country and global level. First, it proposes establishing country-specific frameworks, indicators and targets for monitoring progress and promoting mutual accountability published on a regular basis. At the global level, it proposes establishing (limited?) indicators and targets by June 2012 to monitor progress on Busan, linked to existing commitments and initiatives in partner countries. The results of this exercise will be published (possibly on an annual basis). Finally it proposes strengthening the capacity of countries to monitor and evaluate progress. In terms of future aid architecture, at an international level, it proposes an open multi-stakeholder Global Partnership

for Effective Development Cooperation to oversee and support implementation and act as a space for dialogue, learning, development and implementation of norms and standards, and monitoring progress and accountability at the national and global level. By June 2012, the proposal is to finalize the arrangements and membership, identify opportunities for regular ministerial engagement that complements the work of other fora, including UN Development Cooperation Forum (**UNDCF**). Significantly, the OECD and UN Development Programme are called on to support the Partnership's functioning, respective of their mandates and comparative advantage.

BOD5 will shed further clarity on some key areas of concern still under negotiation.

2.2 Negotiating the outcome document

Since the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (**WP-EFF**) meeting at the beginning of October, a third and fourth draft BOD have come out. To negotiate a final text going into Busan, the WP-EFF has put together a team of Sherpas drawn from donors (5), Middle (3, coordinated by South Korea) and Low-Income Countries (4),⁴ fragile states (1), the UN system (1), the World Bank (1) and civil society.⁵ The Chair of BetterAid is the CSO representative and his work is supported by a negotiating team from the BetterAid Coordinating Group and the Open Forum Global Facilitating Group. The UK Sherpa represents the Nordic Plus, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Sherpas have met already on October 27 and November 4 (with BOD3 as the basis for discussion), and will meet again on November 18, working with a fourth draft. The "final" draft will come out of this discussion.

The WP-EFF Co-Chair⁶ ambition is to have a final negotiated text by November 29, so that HLF-4 can showcase the achievements and a forward-looking agenda for development co-operation. However, this text may still be subject to further negotiations during HLF-4. Ministers arrive on the evening of Day 1 and will resolve outstanding issues on Day 2 and 3, as was the case in Accra in 2008. It is not inconceivable that the "agreed text" could be changed by the ministers. How such negotiations on-site will happen is unclear, nor whether CSOs will (or will want to) be at this negotiating table.

2.3 Plans for HLF-4 itself

The key political product of Busan will be the outcome document. As noted above, this sets out the common and differentiate principles and commitments that all stakeholders would endorse. The actual HLF will focus on the forward looking agenda, geared around a series of high-level plenary and parallel thematic sessions on lessons from Paris and Accra and on a range of core issues for future action. The parallel sessions are being coordinated by different countries and will all have a multi-stakeholder format, although the representation of civil society in some of them remains an open question. The following chart is an outline of this agenda (which is still subject to change):

A central organizing feature of HLF4 are "building blocks" – voluntary, multi-stakeholder processes and commitments by a group to a plan to carry forward their HLF-4 commitments in practice in key areas.

⁴ Some people voiced concern that the team was heavily biased towards the donors and emerging economies, with little power to real aid recipients. This perhaps influenced the decision to add a fourth LIC representative at the end of October.

⁵ The team includes the following: Wp-Eff Co-Chair, Talaat Abdel-Malek, South Korea as the Host Government; LICs: Rwanda, Honduras, Bangladesh and Mali; MICs: China, Mexico, South Africa; G7+: Timor Leste; Donors: European Commission, France, Japan, UK, US; international agencies: World Bank and UNDP; CSO: Better Aid.

⁶ Note that one of the Co-Chairs, Bert Kunders from the Netherlands, was required to resign after the October Working Party Meeting as he has been appointed the UN Special Representative in the Ivory Coast.

While some building blocks are being profiled in the agenda of HLF4, there are others that will receive attention in side events (such as a possible building block on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment). Many of these sessions are being organized around key ministers who want opportunities to profile the work of their development agency through presentations. Many of the ministers will be arriving on the second day and that day is in part devoted to highlighting outcomes of some of the building block sessions from the first day assuming that ministers from some countries will give political commitment to carry these agendas forward.

In addition to the formal plenary process, there will be 38 side events running simultaneously with the plenary sessions. It is expected that with 2000 plus delegates there will many opportunities for ministers and others to participate more directly in the Busan agenda through these side events. CSOs have two dedicated side events: 1) CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment: Multi-Stakeholder Approaches to Post-Busan Initiatives (Coordinated by the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment – Brian Tomlinson)⁷; and Setting Examples for Accountability (ICSO Advisory Group for the Open Forum and the Berlin Civil Society Centre).

	Day 1 (29 Nov)	Day 2 (30 Nov)	Day 3 (1 Dec)
Morning	<p>Plenary</p> <p>Welcome Address</p> <p>Progress Since Paris: How Far Have We Come?</p> <p>Review evidence from PD Monitoring & Evaluation</p>	<p><u>Opening Ceremony</u></p> <p>Key Speeches by VIPs (President of Korea, Heads of State, UNSG, OECD SG) setting the scene</p> <p>Report from CSO Forum and Parliamentary Forum</p>	<p>3. How to Maximise Impact on Development? (in plenary)</p> <p>Building blocks presentation on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Effective Institutions and Policies •Private Sector
	<p>Thematic sessions (in parallel).</p> <p>“Lessons learned from Paris and Accra: Actions to move forward”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ownership and Accountability 2. Country Systems 3. Addressing Aid Fragmentation 4. Aid Predictability and Transparency 5. Results 	<p>1. Unfinished Business and Remaining Challenges (in plenary)</p> <p>Building blocks presentation on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparency • Results and Accountability • Managing Fragmentation <p><i>Special Session on Gender (in parallel with plenary 1)</i></p>	<p>A New Consensus on Aid and Development (in plenary)</p> <p>Discussion on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Direction and Principles of Future Development Cooperation •Post-Busan Governance Framework
After noon	<p>Thematic sessions (in parallel)</p> <p>“From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CD and Knowledge exchange 2. Rights-based approaches 3. Fragility, Conflict, and Vulnerability 4. South-South and Triangular cooperation 5. Public-Private Cooperation 	<p>2. Diversity and Opportunities in an Evolving Development Landscape (in plenary)</p> <p>Building blocks presentation on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •South-South and Triangular Cooperation •Fragile States •Climate Finance 	<p><u>Closing Ceremony</u></p>
	<p>(Time allocated for side events)</p>	<p>(Time allocated for side events)</p>	
On-going	<p>Knowledge and Innovation Space (KIS) & Programme of Side Events</p>		<p>1</p>

Table one – HLF4 Proposed agenda

In addition there will be a special high level session on Gender Equality (Day 2), Parliamentary Forum (Day 1), Youth Forum (Day 1), Private Sector Forum (Day 2), and Knowledge and Innovation Space (KIS).

2.4 Organizational structure post-Busan

Following the July Working Party meeting, an informal working group was set up to consider options for

⁷ This event is on November 29th, 17:30 to 19:00, with Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, Co-Chair of the Open Forum, Finnish Minister of Development Cooperation and Honduran Minister of Planning and Cooperation.

post-Busan operational arrangements. These were presented at the October WP-EFF. Essentially the proposal is a strong focus on implementation at the country level – country ownership and leadership for steering development efforts at the country-level, with a light multi-stakeholder global structure (Global Partnership) to propose and monitor country-level norms and principles. A Secretariat would be needed that would build on existing competencies of the OECD-DAC Secretariat and draw on southern think tanks and regional work streams where possible.

While there was support for these ideas in October and in the current BOD, a number of individuals raised concerns regarding global indicators and monitoring of commitments. Many were unsure about setting up a new structure, rather than building on the strengths of the WP-EFF – and using this to follow-up on the Paris and Accra Agendas, and the Building Blocks to support the Post-Busan framework.

3. 0 Canada and Busan

3.1 Canadian participation in Busan

From Canada, the following will be going to Busan: Robert Fox, Oxfam Canada; Joseph Ingram and Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute; Gervais L’Heureux, Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale; Fraser Reilly-King and Julia Sanchez, Canadian Council for International Co-operation; and Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada. Julia will only participate in the CSO Forum and not in the official process.

From the government side, at least the following will attend: The Hon. Beverley Oda, Minister for International Cooperation; Margaret Biggs, President, CIDA; Vincent Rigby, Vice-President, Policy Branch; Caroline Leclerc, Canadian Representative to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness; Jennifer Lalonde, Senior Analyst and Lead on Aid Effectiveness, and Tara Carney, Senior Policy Analyst, Strategic Planning.

3.2 Canada’s policy priorities for Busan

In January, CCIC obtained a document that was circulating between a number of “like-minded” countries including Canada⁸ identifying results and value for money, transparency, accountability, and cooperation with the private sector as four shared strategic priorities for Busan.

The “results, accountability and transparency nexus” is the priority issue for Canada in Busan, and it has been recommending its work on health and accountability as a model framework for other donors to shape their work (by sector) on results.⁹ How Canada is approaching these issues in the context of the Outcomes Document can be gleaned from its comments on BOD2 (accessible to all WP-EFF members), from comments during the October WP-EFF meeting and on some informal feedback from officials. In summary, Canada is seeking a BOD that does the following:

- Is political and not technical, leaving the elaboration of commitments, such as specific indicators and targets, to a post Busan process (para 30 and other relevant paras).

⁸ It includes Canada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, UK and USA.

⁹ The UN Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health and the Commission’s Report, “Keeping Promises, Measuring Results” offers a framework that tracks results and resource flows at country and global levels; identifies a core set of common indicators for health to measure progress and reduce duplicative requests placed on developing countries; proposes steps to improve health information and registration of key health events; explores ways to enhance access to reliable information on resources and outcomes; and establishes global-level coordination and accountability through an independent Expert Review Group that reports to the UN on the strategy.

- Puts results “at the heart of the Busan outcome document”, with some stress on sharing and managing risk between development partners and partner countries (para 15 in BOD3). It has no major issues with the current language of para 15 on results. Canada has been working with other donors to develop a set of principles for joint risk management (essentially taking a more holistic approach to issues related to risk, combining these with elements to help donor and partner countries better manage risk, all with a view to encouraging donors to become more risk-tolerant and direct more resources to traditionally higher-risk countries).
- Supports the importance of “development effectiveness”, but wants it to be more clearly defined.
- Supports using the notion of “democratic ownership” in place of “inclusive ownership” in para 14, now replaced in BOD3 by the notion of “developing countries and their citizens”.
- Has been quite positive on civil society (para 19), suggesting a para along the lines of “We acknowledge the efforts of the international community of CSOs to develop principles and guidance on how to enhance their own effectiveness, and accountability. We encourage the adoption and context specific application of the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness.” This language has been superseded by para 19b in BOD3. Canada’s comments on BOD2 also called for greater clarity on ensuring an enabling environment for CSOs.
- Supports a reference to IATI without exclusive acceptance of IATI as THE transparency framework (para 20). Canada argues that it is compatible with IATI (in that it uses CRS++),¹⁰ but this compatibility does not mean it has to be fully compliant with all phases of the IATI standard. It also supports referencing the Open Government agreement to which it is a signatory.
- Is reluctant to include language on climate change and anti-corruption because there are other multilateral processes that are competent in these areas. More positively, it suggests improving language for anti-corruption if the para remains to recognize that civil society have a key role to play in the prevention and fight against corruption.

On the private sector, the government’s approach is less clear – beyond supporting the extractive sector. Officials began drafting a private sector policy paper in fall 2011 to help frame the government’s approach. Comments on BOD2 had no major issues with the paragraphs on the private sector as development actors.

3.3 Canada’s Activities in Busan

CIDA is actively supporting the building block on future activities relating to results, transparency and accountability (along with a number of like-minded governments). The initiative comprises two dimensions: developing countries defining (i) results and (ii) development cooperation provider performance. It involves commitments to more manageable indicators, joint assessment of performance, joint evaluation, transparent result reporting using country systems, and capacity development for results based public sector management systems.

Canada is also implicated in three side events: with Denmark on “Risks for Results: Managing Risks Jointly for Better Development Results”; on “Resiliency” and “Gender Equality” although we don’t have the details. The latter may be part of the High-Level session on Gender Equality. An event on “Strengthening accountability for results at country level: what can be learned from health?” in which Minister Bev Oda was listed as a possible speaker with WHO, World Vision, Save the Children, and the Task Team on Health was supposedly cancelled.

¹⁰ IATI is the International Aid Transparency Initiative; CRS++ is the DAC’s own Extended Converged Reporting Standard.

4. CSO Priorities for Busan

4.1 BetterAid and the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness

Since the last HLF in Accra, Ghana, BetterAid, a platform of more than 900 organizations, has become an official member of the WP-EFF. As such, BetterAid is a key civil society interlocutor on issues related to aid and development effectiveness at the HLF. In March 2011, it released its "[CSO Key Asks on the Road to Busan](#)", framed around four key themes:

- **Fully evaluate and deepen the Paris and Accra commitments** through reforms based on democratic ownership (including full transparency as the basis for strengthened accountability and good governance);
- **Strengthen development effectiveness** through development cooperation practices that promote human rights standards and focus on the eradication of the causes of poverty and inequality (focusing on a rights-based approach to development, gender equality and women's rights, and decent work and social inclusion);
- **Affirm and ensure the participation** of the full diversity of **CSOs as independent development actors in their own right** (by endorsing the [Istanbul Principles](#) (IP) and acknowledging the [International Framework](#)); and,
- **Promoting equitable and just development architecture** (through an inclusive compact with time-bound commitments and fundamental reforms to the aid architecture, including the establishment of an equitable and inclusive multilateral forum for dialogue).

The Asks remain a key reference document; but as the negotiations on the BOD proceed,¹¹ BetterAid is nuancing its positions on a range of issues, in particular the following in the current draft BOD:

- A clear definition of development effectiveness,¹² grounded in a rights-based approach to development;
- The broadest possible participation and reaffirmation of Paris and Accra in the BOD, including the inclusion of time-bound targets for the implementation of all three;
- Taking a needs-based and demand-driven approach to development co-operation with a view to tackling growing inequality;
- Moving beyond national ownership to inclusive and democratic ownership, including developing inclusive multi-stakeholder country compacts with common, but differentiated, standards;
- Fully untying aid and strengthening predictability by 2015;
- Making all aid comparable and publicly accessible, through implementing the International Aid Transparency Initiative and its standards for information on development cooperation;
- Developing standards for differentiated approaches to conflict, violence and fragility;
- Endorsing the *Istanbul Principles* and committing to minimum standards for an enabling environment as defined by the Open Forum's *Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness*;
- Putting inclusive multi-stakeholder processes and structures at the heart of any future aid architecture.

4.2 Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment

¹¹ BetterAid Response to the First BOD, online at http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/revised-cso_response_to_busan_outcome_document.pdf; and to the Second BOD, on-line at http://www.betteraid.org/en/member-downloads/doc_download/410-betteraid-response-to-bod-1.html

¹² While the BOD references "development effectiveness" (DE), it is for the most part understood to mean better policy coherence so that other policies (trade, investment, etc.) don't undermine aid policies. In contrast, BetterAid views DE as an approach that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality and marginalization, and in the context of aid, that deepens the impact of development cooperation on the capacities of poor and marginalized people to realize their rights.

The Task Team on CSO development effectiveness and Enabling Environment (TT) is a multi-stakeholder body that has worked under the auspices of the WP-EFF. Its co-chairs (SIDA, Government of Mali and Open Forum) has made a number of comments, in particular on para 19 of the draft BOD. These include trying to provide greater clarity on an enabling environment and minimum standards to be met by governments with specific reference to human rights standards as the basis of these standards. The TT also suggested strengthening the section on ownership, making it more obvious that ownership can involve leadership by CSOs or other development actors (e.g. private sector, local government, communities), with varied priorities, and that inclusive ownership of government plans must be grounded in multi-stakeholder dialogue. This also includes making more consistent reference in the BOD to citizens and country partners to make the BOD more inclusive and multi-stakeholder.

4.3 Other CSO positions

While BetterAid has been the lead organization following Busan and shaping CSO positions for Busan, three other entities have also come out with public positions.

4.3.1 International Civil Society Organizations on Accountability

At the end of June, CARE International, Civicus, Oxfam International, Plan International, Transparency International and World Vision International, among others, released a [common position paper](#) on “Accountability, Transparency and Verification”. It is intended to deepen existing BetterAid demands, and is consistent with the above positions. On accountability, it recommends establishing a set of accountability standards for all development actors, deepening mutual accountability between donors and partner governments, strengthening the capacity of local stakeholders to hold their governments to account, and looking to the International NGO Accountability Charter and the IP as useful frameworks for CSO accountability. On transparency, it calls on all donors to comply with IATI, partner countries to comply with a comparable standard like the Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), on greater public information in terms of aid disbursement, allocation and management, and for all countries to secure an enabling environment for CSOs to be transparent and accountable. On verification, it calls on donors and partner countries to agree on a verification framework to assess aid effectiveness through various pro-active and responsive mechanisms, including indicators, targets and timelines, with meaningful input from CSOs in designing the process.

4.3.2 Oxfam International

Oxfam International has also released [a brief](#) that tackles donors’ obsessive focus on results. It argues effectively that donors must resist the temptation to prioritize results that they can count in the short-term, but which will count less to poor women and men in the long-term. This is consistent with BetterAid’s efforts to shift the focus to development, not aid, effectiveness. Oxfam argues donors must instead prioritize the “right” results: measuring outcomes and impacts (not inputs and outputs), and being more innovative in how they measure change (like budget support and empowerment); providing development cooperation that is needs-based and demand-driven – even if results can be harder to measure here (e.g. fragile states); defining the results in collaboration with the people being measured; and using aid to address unequal power dynamics (including protecting the enabling environment for civil society, directly supporting civil society, in particular women’s groups, and supporting mechanisms that strengthen citizen oversight of country systems). Recently Oxfam International issued [a joint appeal](#) with the Chairperson of the DAC, Brian Attwood, calling for an ambitious outcome for Busan.

4.3.3 Save the Children

The [Save the Children paper](#) is also consistent with BetterAid demands, taking a rights-based approach to development, but largely focuses on deepening and strengthening Paris and Accra. This includes recommendations on increasing mutual accountability, local and national capacity and use of country systems, transparency, and harmonisation (along country and sectoral lines). It also recommends bringing new actors into the aid effectiveness tent. Remarkably it mention seither BetterAid nor the Open Forum.

4.4 CSO Activities for Busan

In October, BetterAid in collaboration with the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) launched a [public campaign](#), with a number of postcards that GCAP coalitions around the World are collecting and sending to their Ministers, around the tag line “BetterAid for the world we want.” Prior to this, in July, “Publish What You Fund” also launched a [public campaign](#) geared around making aid transparent.

On November 25, 26 and 27, BetterAid, in collaboration with KOFID and the Open Forum, are organizing a Busan Global Civil Society Forum – an effort to get all [280 civil society organizations](#) (CSOs) that will be official delegates up to speed on the process, agenda and activities planned for HLF4. The two and a half day event will include a key note by Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, an overview of HLF-4 (CSO key asks, BOD, HLF Agenda), a number of parallel sectoral and thematic workshops on a range of issues organized by different groups, and then a number of preparatory sessions directly related to the HLF-4 agenda and discussions.

Civil society groups are also involved in a number of thematic sessions (in particular on capacity building, democratic ownership, rights-based approaches) and organizing a number of side events as noted above. Some Canadian groups will be [blogging](#) from Busan.