

THE ACCRA THIRD HIGH LEVEL FORUM ON AID EFFECTIVENESS: A CCIC PARTICIPANT ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOMES

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“Today, we are faced with an unprecedented combination of natural, political, economic and social crises that increase poverty and the burden of survival for poor women and men especially in developing countries. According to recent figures, 1.4 billion women and men live under the new poverty line of US\$1.25. Of this figure, the majority are women....

The sum of our message is very clear: change has to happen to ensure that issues of poverty eradication, gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability are the real pillars of development effectiveness. We need to use international agreed human rights provisions as the basis for global governance and relationships so that aid will one day become unnecessary...”

Rose Mensah-Kutin
Convenor, Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana (NETRIGHT)
Address, Ministerial Dinner on behalf of CSOs, Accra HLF, September 3, 2008

“We need an *Accra Agenda for Action* that sends the right political message of commitment to change and to action. This is what is at stake and what we are negotiating for -- not so much technical commitments for implementation of the Paris Declaration, but a message to governments of the South, the CSOs and the citizens of the world that we are serious to deliver reform to end poverty...

The world does not need, at this point, a bad *Accra Agenda for Action* that is full of words but lacking in commitment for action.... The world needs the politics of peace and development, focused on achieving the Millennium Development Goals and ending poverty...”

Tony Tujan
Chairperson, CSO International Steering Group
Address, Ministerial Dinner on behalf of CSOs, Accra HLF, September 3, 2008

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INTRODUCTION

1. An unprecedented 700 representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs) gathered in Accra, Ghana, at the beginning of September, on the occasion of the Accra High Level Forum (HLF). For many CSOs, this was the culmination of more than a year's consultations, preparations and engagement on issues affecting the fundamental reform of aid practices and its impact on development, ending global poverty and realising human rights for poor and marginalised people. The Accra Third HLF was originally intended by its organisers (the OECD DAC Secretariat, the Government of Ghana, and the World Bank) as a largely technical stocktaking review of indicators of progress by donors and governments in achieving some limited objectives to reform in aid practices by 2010, as set out in the 2005 *Paris Declaration*.¹
2. CSOs mobilised to influence this Accra HLF official agenda in numbers unprecedented for an international meeting on aid. The HLF was immediately preceded by an Accra CSO Parallel Forum, overwhelmed by an unexpected turnout of more than 700 participants from 80 countries (plans were made for 400). In the few days prior to the HLF, the Accra International Women's Forum also took place, with more than 250 women's rights organisations, gender advocates and experts from all the regions of the world present. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) held a preparatory meeting for about 50 trade unionists, the majority of whom from developing countries. CSO religious-based networks, farmers' organisations, debt campaigners, CIVICUS, parliamentarians, among others, were all present, visible and vocal. From among these CSOs, 80 were official delegates with full rights to participate and intervene in the official HLF.² This level of engagement contrasts markedly with the mere 14 CSOs (including CCIC) present in Paris in March 2005 at the final negotiations and signing of the *Paris Declaration*.

¹ For CSO critiques of the Paris Declaration see Better Aid at www.betteraid.org, the Reality of Aid at www.realityofaid.org, Eurodad at www.eurodad.org, and CCIC's aid page at www.ccic.ca.

² The international process of CSO preparations and engagement for the High Level Forum was coordinated by a CSO International Steering Group (ISG), which was open to all CSOs committed to actively work on these preparations (see the list at www.betteraid.org). CSO statements from the Accra process can be found on www.betteraid.org. The ISG was the primary CSO interlocutor with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, a body of donors and developing country governments mandated to monitor the implementation of the Paris Declaration, prepare the Accra HLF and develop a draft AAA. The ISG also worked with a coalition of Ghanaian CSOs and IBON (Philippines) to organise the CSO Parallel Forum.

CSO delegates to the HLF were nominated and chosen through a decentralised ISG process with criteria for prior engagement in the preparatory processes on aid and development effectiveness, regional distribution and types of CSOs. There were five official Canadian CSO delegates to the HLF (Molly Kane (Inter Pares), Pat Mooney (ETC), Gerry Barr (CCIC), Anna Nitoslawska (CLC) and myself), but others were able to attend as the HLF official organisers were unable to manage registration and opened the doors to others, present but not registered, to attend.

3. The Parallel CSO Forum established an ambitious “high bar” for bold commitment to genuine change in the outcomes of the Accra HLF. CSOs aimed to establish both specific undertakings in the *Accra Agenda for Action* (the HLF outcomes document) on key issues and “to set the table” for the issues to be negotiated in the preparations for the post-Paris Declaration. These include:
- ☐ Development effectiveness as the measure of aid effectiveness, with new indicators by 2010 to measure aid effectiveness in terms of international human rights standards, gender equality, decent work and sustainable development.
 - ☐ Country ownership as *democratic* ownership, with citizens and parliaments fully engaged in debating and setting development priorities for the alignment of aid to country priorities.
 - ☐ Time-bound specific targets for the maximum and flexible use of developing country systems, with multiple-year rolling aid resource commitments, increasing country level predictability of aid.
 - ☐ Significant reduction in the burden of policy conditionality by 2010.
 - ☐ An ambitious target for demand-led technical assistance by 2010.
 - ☐ Elimination of tied aid by 2010, including food aid and technical assistance.
 - ☐ Agreement and implementation of new international standards of transparency by 2009, which include access to timely information by beneficiary populations, and independent aid monitoring as the basis for mutual accountability.³
4. At the Accra Women’s International Forum, CSO delegates stressed that “aid effectiveness without gender equality and women’s rights perspective will not lead to effective development, neither will it contribute to reduce poverty, inequalities and the achievement of the MDGs”. Among its several recommendations the Forum called for “a strategic plan for financing gender equality and women’s empowerment that is reflected in budget guidelines into the monitoring system of the PD implementation”. It calls on governments and donors “to ensure and establish clear mechanisms for the participation of women’s rights organisations as part of civil society, particularly women from excluded groups, in all national development planning processes and aid planning...” Forum participants rejected all policy conditionality attached to aid, including so-called “positive conditionality” related to gender equality. “Instead, mutual responsibility, accountability, and transparency of donors and developing countries must be applied and strengthened towards gender equality and human rights standards and goals”. Finally, the Forum called for gender specific indicators in assessing the results of the Paris Declaration.⁴

³ See Civil Society Voices for Better Aid, “Civil society statement in Accra warns urgent action on aid”, September 1, 2008, accessible at <http://betteraid.org>.

⁴ See the Accra Women’s International Forum Statement, “Recommendations for Action on Development Effectiveness in Accra and Beyond”, August 30, 2008, accessible at http://betteraid.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=213&Itemid=1

5. What was achieved during more than a year of intensive CSO preparations and engagement for Accra? CSOs clearly were deeply frustrated and disappointed by the limited ambition of negotiations, which, by the time delegates had arrived in Accra, most new language and time-bound targets in the AAA had been diluted or removed. On key issues of aid reform of concern to CSO and to developing country governments, several donors (particularly but not only, the United States and Japan) strongly resisted making any progress beyond the *Paris Declaration*. Despite the addition of references to gender equality in several paragraphs, there were no concrete initiatives to strengthen gender sensitivity in implementing the Paris Declaration commitments by donors and governments. Nevertheless, by the final day of the HLF, a synergy of interests between developing country governments, CSOs and some like-minded donors were able, at the last moment, to bring some new commitments into the AAA. When seen alongside a number of parallel initiatives over the next two years (a CSO Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness and the UN Financing for Development process and the UN Development Cooperation Forum), the *Accra Agenda for Action* could be the foundation for the *possibility* of a very different post-Paris Declaration, in 2011, one that focuses on issues of aid and development effectiveness, not aid effectiveness.
6. The following sections of this report identify some key aspects of the Accra HLF as background to this overall assessment. A subsequent section points to specific contributions by Canada to the HLF. An appendix sets out key issues for CSOs in aid reform and analyses briefly the implications of related language contained in the AAA.

WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED?

7. **A change in discourse towards development effectiveness...** In various policy dialogues with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness since early 2007, the CSO International Steering Group clearly asserted that aid and development effectiveness were mutually reinforcing concepts.⁵ For CSOs, aid delivery can only be considered effective in its development impact on poverty and inequality – in its support for people claiming their rights, in promotion of women's rights, in its contributions to livelihoods and decent work, in building sustainable environments and in supporting democratic determination of development priorities. While welcoming the Paris Declaration principles to guide reform of aid delivery⁶, CSOs consistently critiqued the limited reforms associated with these principles in the Declaration, particularly those undertaken by donors, and its technocratic reforms only addressing effective mechanisms for aid between donors and developing country governments. During these dialogues, donors on the Working Party agreed on the importance of development effectiveness, but asserted that their remit was aid effectiveness; other multilateral processes at the UN addressed development impact (i.e. achieving the MDGs).

⁵ See International Steering Group, Better Aid Policy Paper, 2007, accessible on www.betteraid.org. This policy paper and its set of recommendations framed the ISG's responses to the various drafts of the AAA since April 2008.

⁶ The five principles set out in the Paris Declaration are country ownership, alignment to country priorities, harmonisation of donor terms and conditions for aid, managing aid for results, and mutual accountability for these results.

8. The *Accra Agenda for Action* has language that now addresses the relationship between aid and development effectiveness. The AAA states that

“Gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men and children. It is vital that all our policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent way.” [para 3]

“We commit to continuing efforts in monitoring and evaluation that will assess whether we have achieved the commitments agreed in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and to what extent aid effectiveness is improving and generating greater development impact.” [para 11]

“Developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability.” [para 13c]

9. In most of the nine Roundtables, which were the venues for policy discussion and debate at the HLF, the predominant discourse focused on issues of development impact of aid on poverty, inequality, participation and democratic ownership. Clearly the participation of CSOs in these Roundtables accentuated such an emphasis, but it was noticeable that donor and government officials, including panel presentations organised by donor and government co-chairs, also took up these issues, largely sidelining technical issues of aid management.
10. The Roundtable outcomes are significant as they will inform the content for a Chairman’s Report for the Accra HLF, which will accompany the AAA, and which should be a starting point for the Working Party and its preparations for the 4th HLF.
11. **Wide acceptance that the Paris Declaration has failed to deliver even modest reform...** During the plenary presentations and the Roundtable discussions, no one disputed that progress in the reforms agreed in Paris has been much too slow and needed to go deeper. In fact this lack of progress was used by some donors to justify their reluctance to make further commitments. Aid was widely seen to be still much too tied, unpredictable, with little accountability and limited use of country systems (despite implementing donor conditions for reforms in government systems, including opening to international procurement, which undermine local suppliers). While there is certainly significant differences between donors and CSOs on the pace and nature of reforms, several HLF speakers emphasised that donor behaviour must change. Issues of conditionality, tied aid, strengthening accountability and space for developing country citizens to determine appropriate development policies, were the subject of debate and discussion. Developing country governments and several donors, particularly the EU, spoke of the urgency of more ambitious reforms than were agreed in the draft AAA. Brazil issued a statement early in the HLF strongly critical of the AAA. After ministers arrived, the EU seemed ready to release its own commitments if the AAA could not be strengthened. In the end, EU ministers, along with Brazil and other developing countries, were successful in amending the AAA on some concerns.

12. Even on issues, such as conditionality, which were largely ignored in the Paris Declaration and had almost no progress in the AAA, Roundtable discussions resulted in proposals to ministers and the HLF Chairperson that could move forward a more explicit debate post-Accra. A key message from the Roundtable on Country Ownership (chaired by Switzerland and Colombia), for example, stated that

“There is strong evidence showing that policy conditionalities don’t work as intended. Donors should take this evidence seriously and respect country leadership when negotiating the terms and conditions of aid. The respect of human rights, including women’s rights, constitutes the basis for the definition of such terms.”

This Roundtable message that conditionality undermines country ownership goes much further than the AAA, which calls for “mutually agreed” conditions that “support ownership” [para 25] and could establish different rights-based foundation for the continuing debate on conditionality. The AAA in paragraph 25c calls for a review of “good practices” in conditionality “with a view to strengthening country ownership” and explicitly says that this review will “be receptive to contributions from civil society”.

13. **Proactive negotiating by developing countries strengthened language on mutual accountability, use of country systems and South / South cooperation...** By January 2008 developing country members of the Working Party had come together with their own agenda for the AAA, focusing on use of country systems by donors, demand-led technical assistance, tied aid, conditionality and mutual accountability. An informal synergy between CSOs and some developing countries on common policy goals for Accra began to be evident after April. The various drafts of the AAA began to respond to pressures from these countries to address their concerns. But since the first public draft in April, various groups of donors and the World Bank pushed back and eliminated even the most modest specific proposals by the time the third draft arrived in Accra.
14. Along with CSOs, officials and ministers from developing countries pushed back to reassert some language favourable to developing countries in last minute negotiations. While not successful in getting a time-bound commitment (end of 2009) for donors to create plans to eliminate tied aid, they were able to strengthen language on the use of country systems as “the first option for aid programs in support of activities managed by the public sector” [para 15a].⁷ Donors added a last moment commitment that at least 50% of government-to-government aid would use country systems by 2010, one of the few time-bound new commitments in the AAA [para 15e]. They were also able to strengthen language on mutual accountability with the inclusion of developing country partners in the regular DAC donor peer reviews of members’ aid policies and practices [para 24c].

⁷ A CSO representative pointed out during the first HLF plenary that the criteria for donor use of country systems undermined the right to development by forcing the opening of government procurement to foreign bidders, unfairly competing with local providers and the government’s ability to strengthen its local economy.

15. Brazil in particular was very active, and was highly critical of current aid governance as well as donor approaches to South / South cooperation. They insisted that the principles and criteria that donors assume in their own aid relationships do not necessarily apply to South / South co-operation. In last minute additions to the AAA paragraph 19d, on “working with all development actors”, South / South co-operation on development is defined as co-operation that

“aims to observe the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity, and identity and local content. It plays an important role in international development co-operation and is a valuable complement to North / South co-operation.” [19d]

Paragraph 19a refers to the Paris Declaration only “as a point of reference” for South / South co-operation. The principles in paragraph 19d go well beyond those set out in the Paris Declaration, with much stronger references to principles of equality of nation states, embedded in the United Nations. They implicitly challenge donor policies of conditionality, tied aid and supply-led technical assistance, which the AAA continues to fail to address.

16. **Deepening country ownership and recognising CSOs as development actors in their own right...** CSOs were unambiguous in calling for the recognition of democratic ownership as the foundation for strengthening country ownership in aid relationships. The AAA does not refer to “democratic ownership”, but it does clearly commit to “broaden country-level policy dialogue on development” through a closer involvement of parliaments, local authorities and CSOs in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans [para 13a]. It calls on donors to support efforts to increase the capacities of these actors “to take an active role in dialogue on development policy” [13b]. Unfortunately however the AAA suggests no indicators to assess progress in this commitment to deepen country ownership. Words must inform changes at the country level. Country-level CSOs must be in a position to monitor and report on progress for a broader country-level dialogue on development by 2010.
17. The engagement of CSOs in preparations and during the HLF was the hallmark of this High Level Forum. Eighteen months ago, CSOs were challenged by several donors, and some developing country governments, to address how they were going to contribute directly to the implementation of the Paris Declaration. This is a mission that most CSOs rejected. By April of this year the discourse had shifted; CSOs are acknowledged in the AAA as development actors in their own right. Paragraph 20 of the AAA states that

“We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector. We [donors and governments] share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential.”

Rather than calling upon CSOs to implement the Paris Declaration, the signatories to the AAA “invite CSOs [as development actors in their own right] to reflect on how they can apply the Paris principles of aid effectiveness *from a CSO perspective* [emphasis added]” [para 20a].

18. This shift in attitude and discourse on CSOs and aid effectiveness is the product of the constructive engagement of CSOs through the International CSO Steering Group⁸ as well as the particularly strong leadership of Canada and CIDA as chair of the multi-stakeholder Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. The Advisory Group conducted in-depth consultations with CSOs, donors and governments over the past year, which resulted in a series of specific recommendations to strengthen the recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right, to deepen the Paris Declaration principles by strengthening democratic and local ownership, and to identify enabling conditions for CSO aid effectiveness.⁹ While not explicitly acknowledging the work of the Advisory Group (a creation of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness), the AAA says that donors and governments “will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development” [20c]. A Roundtable on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness in the HLF reported to ministers a strong multi-stakeholder consensus for the recommendations of the Advisory Group and the future engagement of CSOs in the follow-up to the HLF.
19. Finally, in paragraph 20b, donors and governments “welcome the CSOs’ proposal to engage with them in a CSO-led multi-stakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness”. This CSO-led initiative for an Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness responds to the challenge to CSOs, from all stakeholders including CSOs, to define principles and guidance for their own effectiveness as development actors. It follows directly from the recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right, and that CSOs are not subsidiary to principles governing donor / government aid relationships. At the same time, donors and government in the AAA point to several issues that they hope this CSO-led process will address – i) improved coordination of CSO efforts with government programs, ii) enhanced CSO accountability for results, and iii) improved information on CSO activities [para 20b].¹⁰

⁸ As noted above, the International Steering Group came together in 2007 to facilitate CSO engagement with the Accra High Level Forum process. It was made up of CSO coalitions and international NGOs from the North and the South. It was chaired by Tony Tujan (Ibon Foundation) who is also the chairperson for the Reality of Aid Network.

⁹ The Advisory Group’s *Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations* is a strong multi-stakeholder consensus on these issues which sets out a comprehensive approach to deepening country ownership and an enabling environment for CSOs own effectiveness. It is available on CCIC’s web site at http://ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2008-08_ag_synthesis_and_recs.pdf.

¹⁰ CSOs presented to the HLF a *Progress Report on an Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness*, July 2008. This report outlines the key objectives and directions for this process. The aim will be a highly consultative process to reach consensus on key principles for CSO development effectiveness as well as guidelines for their implementation in specific local contexts. It will not aim to reach consensus on a global “CSO Paris Declaration”, given the highly diverse and complex involvement of millions of CSOs in development. See the Progress Report at http://ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2008-07_open_forum_progress_report.pdf.

CANADA AT THE HIGH LEVEL FORUM

20. As noted above, Canada played a significant role in promoting space for maximising CSO engagement with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and in the HLF, while being careful not to speak on behalf of CSOs as chairperson of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. The position of Chair afforded Canada a place in the Working Party's Steering Committee for the HLF from which to make specific contributions to the organisation of the HLF, to various drafts of the AAA and its final negotiations in Accra. In the final session of the HLF, Margaret Biggs, the recently appointed President of CIDA, not only endorsed the AAA on behalf of Canada, but also went further to endorse the work of the Advisory Group:

“Canada supports the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. As we build a joint effectiveness agenda beyond Accra, there is an extraordinary opportunity to recognise and support civil society organisations as full partners in development....Canada strongly supports positive measures by civil society to strengthen their own effectiveness. Civil society contribution is fundamental to the achievement of development results, good governance and accountability.”¹¹

This endorsement of the Advisory Group recommendations, along with Canadian leadership internationally, will give important impetus to finalising in the coming months a CIDA policy on its support for civil society and development, consistent with the Advisory Group's recommendations.

21. In a parallel announcement, Bev Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, announced the government's plan to fully untie Canadian development assistance over the next five years by 2012-13. The initiative carries forward a previous announcement to fully untie Canadian food aid. Untying will mean “moving to global procurement for bilateral development assistance” and will take place “in line with the international recommendations of the OECD”. With this announcement, Canada already fulfils the donor commitment in the AAA to announce a plan for fully untying its aid [para 18b].
22. At the HLF, Canada's statement promised to increase the transparency and predictability of Canadian aid, particularly for a limited number of focus countries in which Canadian aid will be concentrated (confirming earlier policy announcements that Canadian aid will be concentrated on fewer countries). Consistent with measures for improved accountability in the recently passed Canadian ODA Accountability Act, the statement acknowledged that accountability “is at the core of all that we do as governments”. Canada's HLF statement did not address other issues such as conditionality, demand-driven technical assistance or the use of country systems. It will be important for Canadian CSOs to follow closely in the coming months policy and program initiatives by CIDA and other departments responsible for Canadian aid in implementing the commitments made in the AAA.

¹¹ “Canada is Committed to Building a New Aid Relationship: A Canadian Statement for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness”, September 4, 2008, accessible at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-95153928-R38>.

CONCLUSIONS

23. There are no quick fixes for transforming aid into an effective instrument to address poverty. A number of opportunities exists coming out of the Accra HLF for an agenda for aid that focuses aid reform on issues of development effectiveness. But such opportunities must be matched by political will on the part of donors and governments to pursue a new agreement in 2010 within emerging new aid architecture and on continued CSO capacities to promote these directions.
24. The AAA acknowledges its inter-relationship with the UN Financing for Development process and the contributions of the June 2008 first UN Development Cooperation Forum. But it remains a challenge to create a more equitable global platform to debate and resolve issues of aid policy and practice. Can the 4th High Level Forum in 2011 be co-developed by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the UN Development Cooperation Forum? Can northern donors adapt principles for development effectiveness that move towards those suggested in the AAA by developing countries for South / South cooperation? How will CSOs position themselves in the post-Accra dynamics – will CSOs remain on the “high road” agenda and not be seduced by access to the negotiating table where CSOs begin to identify more with the table than its own agenda? How will the evolving Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness relate and contribute to post-Accra CSO, donor and government strategies to move towards an aid and development effectiveness agreements in 2011?
25. In November 2008, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness¹² is scheduled to meet to set out its own post-Accra workplan. Prior to this meeting, CSOs involved in mobilising for Accra, will come together at the end of October to determine a CSO political strategy that addresses these opportunities and challenges. It will provide a CSO perspective to the Working Party and to the Doha Financing for Development review at the end of November. In December, the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness will confirm its workplan and a decentralised process over two or three years to define principles and guidelines for CSO effectiveness. Collectively, donors, governments and CSOs can settle for no less than a post-Paris agreement in 2010-11 that addresses the core issues of democratic ownership, an equitable international policy forum for aid, and aid reforms that achieve the goals of development effectiveness. While CSOs may have much to contribute, this 2011 agreement should remain one between governments (donors and recipients of aid), with CSOs independently confirming their own contributions to development effectiveness.

¹² The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness involves 23 donors and 23 developing country governments and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, including the organising of the next High Level Forum.

APPENDIX ONE
THE ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION AND KEY ISSUES FOR CSOs IN AID REFORM

ISSUE AREA	AAA TEXT	IMPLICATIONS
Use of Country Systems	<p>Donors agree “to use [country] systems to the maximum extent possible”. [15]</p> <p>Donors “agree to use country systems as the first option” for programs with the public sector. [15a]</p> <p>Donors will transparently state the rationale for not using country systems and will review their positions at regular intervals. [15b]</p> <p>Donors will immediately start working on and sharing transparent plans on using country systems in all forms of development assistance. [15d]</p> <p>Donors will provide at least 50% of government to government aid through country systems. [15e]</p>	<p>A key issue is respect for the sovereignty of developing countries on government procurement policies- that is the right to privilege national / local providers.</p> <p>What are CIDA policies on use of country systems for its budget support and sector wide programming?</p> <p>What percentage of Canadian government to government aid currently uses country systems?</p> <p>What are the implications of plans to use country systems for all forms of Canadian development assistance? What will be the impact on Canadian CSOs programming with Canadian or internationally managed parallel CSO structures in developing countries that are based on terms and conditions beyond local CSO systems and remunerations?</p>
Division of Labour	<p>The EU augmented language in the AAA to more strongly endorse processes for division of labour among [European?] donors at the country level.</p> <p>The AAA also calls for donors and governments “to start a dialogue on international division of labour across countries by June 2009”. [17c]</p> <p>The AAA asserts that “we will work to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient aid”. [17d]</p>	<p>How will international discussions affect the long-awaited Canadian policy of country focus (which was reasserted in Canada’s statement at the HLF)?</p> <p>Will Canada engage with its current developing country partners in determining country focus (as implied by 17c)?</p> <p>Will Canada address “aid orphans” in its country allocation policies?</p>

ISSUE AREA	AAA TEXT	IMPLICATIONS
Adapting aid policies for countries in fragile situations	<p>Donors will conduct joint assessments of governance and examine the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity. [21a]</p> <p>PD principles must be adapted and be consistent with DAC Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. [21e]</p> <p>Donors will work on funding modalities that “bridge humanitarian, recovery & longer-term development phases”. [21c]</p>	<p>Is Canada’s whole of government approach to conflict and fragility consistent with the DAC Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations?</p> <p>Will CIDA develop a funding mechanism that bridges the humanitarian, recovery and longer term development continuum, as long advocated by the PAGER Group?</p>
CSOs as development actors in their own right	<p>Donor and governments will “deepen our engagement with civil society organisations”. [20]</p> <p>Recognises CSOs as “independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector”. [20]</p> <p>CSOs need to reflect on how they can apply the PD principles “from a CSO perspective”. [20a]</p> <p>Welcomes the CSO-led Open Forum on CSO development effectiveness. [20b]</p> <p>Calls on donors and governments “to provide an enabling environment that maximises [CSOs] contributions to Development”. [20c]</p>	<p>A key achievement of the Accra HLF that goes beyond the limitations of the donor / government focus of the PD.</p> <p>The Advisory Group on CS and Aid Effectiveness played a key role in developing how CSOs might relate to the principles of the PD and should look at shaping the principles and guidelines for their development effectiveness.</p> <p>See particularly the Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations and the Exploration of Experience and Good Practices & Case Book, available on CIDA’s CSO extranet site at http://web.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cs.</p>
Transparency and Accountability	<p>Transparency and accountability are essential elements for development results. [24]</p> <p>“Donors will publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and when available results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries”. [24a]</p> <p>Will assure that mutual assessment reviews are in place by 2010. [24b] and these reviews will include parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement.</p> <p>Will determine mechanisms for developing country participation in peer reviews by end of 2009. [24c]</p>	<p>Transparency International welcomed the focus on transparency issues, but was disappointed that the AAA did not specify the need for an agreement on transparency and inclusion of the interests of beneficiaries in the agreement.</p> <p>Will CIDA and other government ministries develop reporting formats to respond to the Canadian ODA Accountability Act consistent with this international commitment to greater transparency?</p> <p>How might Canadians and parliament participate in mutual assessment reviews in countries of focus for Canadian aid?</p>

ISSUE AREA	AAA TEXT	IMPLICATIONS
Conditionality	<p>“Change the notion of conditionality to support ownership”. [25]</p> <p>Removed earlier references to “criticality” of conditions; now refers to “mutually agreed conditions based on national development strategies”. [24a]</p> <p>Donors commit to make public all conditions linked to disbursements. [24b]</p> <p>Commitment to document “good practice” linking conditions to country ownership, including “receptive to contributions from civil society”. [25c]</p>	<p>With no definition of “conditions”, it is difficult to judge the meaning of greater transparency for conditions. Also there is no definition of the timeframe in which these are made public. After an agreement is reached with government?</p> <p>What are the implications for CIDA / Department of Finance for its contributions to program funding mechanisms, to IDA and to debt cancellation packages managed by the Bank and / or the IMF?</p>
Predictability of Aid	<p>Addressing predictability is “a matter of priority”. [26]</p> <p>“Beginning now, donors will provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a position to accurate record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their accounting systems”. [26b]</p> <p>“Beginning now, donors will provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three and five year forward expenditure and / or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations”... [26c]</p>	<p>CIDA has committed at the HLF to improve its information for aid predictability. Will this information also be available to other development stakeholders beyond government?</p> <p>Will the government permit CIDA to develop three year budget plans, similar to some other federal department, and make this information publicly available?</p>
Looking Forward	<p>Acknowledges the work of the HLF and draw upon its ideas (i.e. the work of the Roundtables).</p> <p>“To carry forward this work we will need to develop institutionalised processes for the joint and equal partnership of developing countries and the engagement of stakeholders”. [30]</p>	<p>The “landscape” for aid effectiveness discussions / policy-making is changing, and many actors are keen to look beyond the OECD / DAC / Working Party and towards FfD and the UN Development Cooperation Forum for a different institutional context for aid reform in 2011.</p>